This article examines contemporary Dalit assertion in India through an ethnographic case study of a legal tool being mobilized by Tamil Nadu's lowest-ranking [first unnumbered footnote]
INTRODUCTION
Across India, Dalits remain the most marginalized communities, suffering from continued economic deprivation and social exclusion. Despite decades of postcolonial affirmative action policies, state welfare programmes, Dalit NGO and civil society activism, and political mobilization, many Dalits remain without effective weapons in their struggle against everyday dependency, exploitation and discrimination. To date, many processes of Dalit assertion have been piecemeal and partial, often failing to lead to lasting improvements in material livelihoods, social justice and empowerment. This article contributes to theoretical understandings of modes of Dalit assertion in India through an ethnographic case study of a legal tool being mobilized by Dalits in Tamil Nadu in their struggle against caste-based offences. The Arunthathiyars (aka Matharis) of western Tamil Nadu, the state's lowest-ranking Dalit community, have begun to take recourse to a legal instrument, the 1989 Prevention of Atrocities against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act (PoA Act), through which they seek to bring members of higher-caste communities to justice. In regularly appealing to the law and taking (or threatening to take) offenders to court, Arunthathiyars have turned to court litigation to redress a range of offences.
This article explores how the Arunthathiyars of western Tamil Nadu are employing the law, the nature of their collective mobilization around it, and the ways in which their litigation is reshaping the politics of caste in this part of Tamil Nadu.
We discuss how Arunthathiyars' turn to the law and their use of the PoA Act has been accompanied by increased grassroots mobilization in the region. The ethnography reveals that a powerful dialectic has emerged in which local Dalit mobilization is given teeth by the availability of a legal weapon that can be used in pursuit of Dalits' goals. At the same time, grassroots organization and mobilization enables increasingly economically independent Dalits to make use of a legal tool that otherwise few of them would be aware of, let alone know how to use. The article shows that Dalitand indeed other -social movements are more likely to be successful if they are backed up by a legal weapon or supportive legislation, and accompanied by growing economic opportunities and independence. Moreover, we also show how Arunthathiyars' new-found voice in western Tamil Nadu has set in motion a number of reactionary political processes.
in the region, including those resulting from what they perceive to be the misuse of the PoA Act by Arunthathiyars. A process of litigation by Arunthathiyars is thus countered by a renewed politicization of caste by Gounders: an unintended outcome of the litigation route is, therefore, that it consolidates politics along caste lines and further antagonizes caste groups that are already strongly opposed to each other.
On the other hand, the 1989 PoA Act not only provides Arunthathiyars with an unprecedented legal tool to help them assert themselves vis-à-vis the region's dominant caste but also with a novel way to consolidate their emerging collective mobilization. It offers them a new -legal and rights-based -language for reframing the terms of political engagement in the region. We argue that the PoA Act is central to the ongoing transformation of the politics of caste and the political economy of power in western Tamil Nadu. The politics of caste is no longer shaped by the hegemony of the economically and politically dominant caste and contained within private spaces of homes and fields, as it was in this part of the state. Rather, a dialectic of violence is emerging in which caste antagonisms are increasingly being played out in the political arena of courts, legal cases and electoral politics, as well as in the public sphere of street demonstrations, protest marches and media. In this context, the legal avenue has made a significant difference to Arunthathiyars in their search for recognition and assertion, not least, as we will demonstrate, through feelings of fear and anger that the use of the law has engendered among Gounders. It is the new political and affective dynamics produced by Dalit litigation and mobilization -and their impact on the region's caste politics -that are the concern of this article.
DALIT ASSERTION IN INDIA
empowerment, Dalit assertion against social discrimination and economic deprivation is not new. At the time of Independence, untouchability was abolished and affirmative action legislation was introduced to reserve places for Dalits in higher education, parliament and government employment, roughly in line with their proportion of the population. Later, seats in local government bodies, such as Panchayats, were also reserved for Dalits (Lerche, 2008) . Government attempts to mitigate caste discrimination through legislation were complemented with social welfare policies from the 1960s onwards, including universal schooling, PDS (the Public Distribution System), school midday meals, housing schemes and, more recently, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) (Carswell and De Neve, 2013a, 2014a; Heyer, 2012; Heyer and Jayal, 2012; Still, 2011) . These policies not only aimed to alleviate poverty but often targeted Dalits and tribal communities in particular, seeking to improve the material conditions of their livelihoods. While Dalits' progress has been very gradual, gains have certainly been made. It is clear, however, that improvements in Dalits' socioeconomic circumstances are an outcome not only of government welfare programmes and reservation policies, but also of wider transformations in the rural economy that have freed them from bonded relationships, offered them new livelihood opportunities, and reduced their dependency on dominant caste communities (Carswell, 2013; Carswell and De Neve, 2013b; Lerche, 2008; Pandian, 2013 ). Yet despite progress resulting from government schemes, market opportunities and access to education (Ciotti, 2006; Jeffrey et al., 2004) , the socioeconomic marginalization of many Dalit communities remains deeply entrenched in rural society -even in otherwise highly developed and welfareproviding states, such as India's southern state of Tamil Nadu.
Dalits, however, have not left their fate solely in the hands of the state and the market. Since at least the 1980s, they have organized themselves through Dalit movements, grassroots mobilization, transnational advocacy networks, and castebased parties to challenge high-caste domination and extend political representation to their communities.
1 In some parts of the subcontinent such movements have turned into political parties and gained significant political power through electoral success, as illustrated by the impressive rise to power of the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) in northern India in the 1990s and 2000s (Pai, 2000 (Pai, , 2009 (Gorringe, 2007; Harriss, 2002; Wyatt, 2010) . Dravidian parties used Tamilness, Gorringe argues, 'to avoid enacting politically sensitive election pledges on land-reform, dowry and caste ' (2012: 41) , and ended up consolidating the political and economic power of the state's higher castes.
Since the 1980s the Dravidian hegemony has been challenged by a rapid fragmentation of the political party landscape. Smaller parties emerged, many of them being the product of caste-based political mobilizations or caste-based movements, including by Dalits (Gorringe, 2007; Karthikeyan et al., 2012: 31 (Pandian, 2000; Waghmore, 2013) . More recently, transnational advocacy and networking -often drawing on a rights-based language, working in collaboration with INGOs and supported by international donors -have offered Dalits new avenues in their struggles for political and economic emancipation. The debates that surround the pros and cons of such transnational connections are beyond the scope of this article, but are addressed in recent work by Hardtmann (2008) , Lerche (2008) , Steur (2012) (Gorringe, 2010b: 108) . The DPI is primarily a Paraiyar-led party, while the Pallars of southern Tamil Nadu lead the Puthiya Tamilagam, which entered electoral politics in 1996 (Gorringe, 2007; Karthikeyan et al., 2012; Pandian, 2000) .
Thus, caste itself acts a persistent force in fracturing Dalit social mobilization and political representation in the state. Second, despite having a radical and militant agenda at the outset, the transformation of the leading DPI into a political party and its entry into electoral politics has weakened the movement's initial radical, transformative agenda. Indeed, Gorringe argues, the recent institutionalization of Dalit parties in mainstream politics -exemplified by recent cross-party and cross-caste alliance-building efforts -has led to a loss of radicalism: 'political opportunism, it seems, has tamed the Dalit Panthers' (Gorringe, 2007: 64; Wyatt, 2010) . Thus, internal divisions and a lack of unified Dalit mobilization continue to pose serious challenges to Dalit political assertion, including electoral defeat, co-optation by mainstream parties, and the continued exclusion of the most oppressed Dalits such as Arunthathiyars (Gorringe, 2007; Pai, 2009 ).
In Tamil Nadu as elsewhere in India, Dalit assertion has met with high-caste resistance and retribution, often resulting in violent clashes, riots and murder (Gorringe, 2005; Pandian, 2000 (Rao, 2009: 174) . The Act lists a number of abuses, from relatively minor offences like the use of caste names and insults, to brutal incidents of violence, including murder and rape. The atrocities that are most prevalent in this region include not only various insults, the use of caste names, and many other forms of humiliation and discrimination (such as exclusion from temples and separate tea cups at village tea stalls), but also harassment, physical violence and forms of coercion related to bonded labour relations.
In this article, we are not dealing with the question of the effectiveness of this Act in legal terms -how many cases are filed, come to court or end in convictions -but rather with the social life of the Act, that is, the ways in which the Act is used and experienced by both Arunthathiyars and higher-caste Gounders, and how litigation contributes to the reshaping of caste relations and caste politics in the region. We are interested in the ways in which the PoA Act has achieved political and symbolic significance among the Arunthathiyars. Despite the fact that it is poorly enforced, few cases actually go to court and even fewer are successful, the practices surrounding this Act and the discourses that it has produced have begun to reshape the politics of caste in western Tamil Nadu. The ethnography presented below reveals that, despite its very limited legal impact, the use of the PoA Act alongside sustained local-level mobilization in the region has raised the profile of the ill-treatment of Arunthathiyars: their struggles are now increasingly played out in the public domain of police stations, courtrooms and the media rather than remaining hidden within the villages. There is clear evidence that caste relations are being transformed, not only through the emerging grassroots mobilization by Arunthathiyars but also through the shifting discourses of power, fear and intimidation that the use (and threat) of the Act has produced. Dalits who previously had nowhere to go can now turn to the courts, and they see 'putting a PCR case' as an important weapon in their fight against discrimination. Although Gounders know they will probably be able to buy their way out of cases, it is not only an expensive inconvenience to have to fight a case but it also turns fear, stigma and public scrutiny onto them. This, we will show, has complex effects. While empowering Dalits, it also encouraged the development of a
Gounder counter-offensive in the form of caste-based electoral politics through which Gounders seek to reaffirm their dominance in the region. This politics reached its peak in 2009 with the launch of the KNMK, a Gounder-led political party which seeks to fend off some of the challenges to the community's power in the region.
SETTING THE SCENE
Our study is based in Kongu Nadu, in western Tamil Nadu, where the Gounders have Gounders (Carswell and De Neve, 2013b; Cederlöf, 1997) . They continue, to this day, to be the primary source of agricultural labour for landowners. In addition, in those villages where Gounders began to invest in power looms from the 1970s onwards, they were also employed as power loom operators in the workshops that mushroomed across the countryside. As the power loom industry is highly labour intensive and requires a constant supply of labour to keep the looms running, Gounders began to offer 'cash advances' to attract and retain labour, thus reproducing relations of debt bondage within this predominantly rural industry (see Carswell and De Neve, 2013b) .
Today, debt bondage in the village power loom industry is a source of great resentment for Arunthathiyars, who remain both tied to, and economically dependent on, Gounders for their livelihoods. This resentment is at least in part fuelled by their awareness of the other opportunities available within this rapidly changing regional economy. In recent decades, the economy of the region has been driven by industrial production for export markets, and many Arunthathiyars are attracted by new jobs, for example in the Tiruppur garment industry. Frustration is particularly high among those Arunthathiyars who are keen to escape village employment in power looms but are unable to do so because of the bonds of debt that keep them tied to Gounder employers. Gounders, in turn, feel increasingly vulnerable in the villages. They see urban developments as threatening their grip over labour, and particularly over Arunthathiyars whom they successfully controlled in the past and whom they wish to keep subordinated in order to safeguard both agriculture and rural industries.
These regional economic transformations have exacerbated tensions between
Gounders and Arunthathiyars, producing increased levels of conflict and antagonism.
Arunthathiyars accuse Gounders of exploitation, debt bondage and other atrocities, while Gounders complain of Arunthathiyars' laziness, lack of commitment and overall untrustworthiness. Gounders also feel that Arunthathiyars are pampered by the state whose various welfare schemes have made paid work less worthwhile for
Arunthathiyars (Carswell and De Neve, 2014a ; Heyer, 2012; Wyatt, 2013) . Atrocities against Arunthathiyars continue on a regular basis in this part of Tamil Nadu, and include disputes over access to temples, public spaces, drinking water, burial grounds and seats on buses, as well as harassment of Dalit women and issues surrounding cash advances in power looms. While debt bondage is more persistent in power loom villages than in predominantly agricultural villages, atrocities against Dalits occur across the region. It is against this wider background that we have to understand
Arunthathiyars' recent mobilization in the region and their turn to the law. While the PoA Act is particularly mobilized in the power loom belt of western Tamil Nadu, often involving disputes over debt and bondage, the Act is used more widely by Dalits in their struggle against a range of offences and atrocities committed by higher-caste people.
DALIT ASSERTION: DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF THE PoA ACT
The relationship between Dalits and Gounders in both study villages, but particularly in Mannapalayam, is a tense and unhappy one. In Mannapalayam, Dalits frequently refer to the jadi kavalai or 'caste trouble' that they experience in the village. This consists not only of persistent forms of caste discrimination, but also of continued economic dependence on Gounders. Discrimination occurs at many levels: Dalits are not allowed into the houses of Gounders (despite working in the power looms attached to those houses); they are given different water pots and cups when at work in the power looms (with the result that most take water from home); they are not allowed inside the temple; they are not allowed to sit in the inner part of the tearoom; and many believe they are given separate cups in the village tearoom. Such discriminatory practices build on long-standing expressions of untouchability in Tamil Nadu that include the refusal of access to village tea shops and the use of the two-tumbler system, which until recently was widespread across the state (Pandian, 2000; Still, 2009) . But fresh in the memory of many Dalits are the even worseoften violent -relations between Dalits and Gounders in the past. Dalits were expected to get off their bicycles and lower their lungis if passing a Gounder, water tanks on Gounders' land would be polluted with cow dung to prevent Dalits from using them, and stories abound of beatings brought on by perceived slights. Dalits had few ways of publicly challenging this behaviour: they depended on Gounders for work, were tied into highly exploitative relations of patronage and had no awareness of the law as an avenue for action.
Today, this has changed and Gounder dominance is increasingly being contested. To some extent, Dalit assertion has been enabled by access to employment outside the village, such as in urban industries, by government welfare programmes, such as the PDS and housing schemes (Heyer, 2012) , and by recent forms of locallevel organization (Gorringe, 2005) . In this region, and for the Arunthathiyars in particular, the availability of and mobilization around the PoA Act is recognized by Dalits themselves as a powerful tool in their struggle against higher-caste domination and oppression. The use of the PoA Act has to be understood against the background of Arunthathiyars' economic dependence on Gounders, and their fear of the power that these rich farmers and power loom owners continue to hold. This power continues to shape Arunthathiyars' everyday social interactions with caste people in the village. Today, the PoA Act has become one of the very few, but highly significant, weapons that Dalits can mobilize against Gounders. In fact, it has become so important to protecting Dalits that, in a discussion about the Act, a Christian Dalit (Adi Dravida) told us that they kept SC (Scheduled Caste) on their community certificates 'for jobs and for safety' -safety meaning that their SC status would allow them to take recourse to the PoA Act in case of an offence against them by a higher-caste person. One Arunthathiyar explained the effect of the PoA Act on higher-caste villagers: 'people are now scared to beat Arunthathiyars because they may be arrested'. Kulandaisamy, a politically active Arunthathiyar, told us:
Earlier Gounders depended on agriculture and as Arunthathiyars were the only ones who worked for them, they wanted us to stay as slaves so that they could survive … But once the PoA Act was launched they became a bit scared because it is a very strong Act. It is only because of this Act that they are being quiet now and not creating problems.
Arunthathiyars perceive the Act not only as a major tool in their current struggle with Gounders but as an effective way to instil a degree of fear in Gounders and thus challenge some of the latter's previously uncontested dominance in the village.
Arunthathiyars now consciously use the PoA Act to confront the otherwise largely The police will always side with the Gounders ... Police will usually make the PCR case fail anyway, and not fill in the forms properly. ... The PCR is a nonbail-able case, but the police will say, we will dilute the case and write it in a different way, but you need to give us some money to do that. Only the police benefit, only the police make money. ... So, in the end all PCR cases are being settled; they negotiate over it and compromise, and it never goes to court.
Police corruption is seen to be widespread and was commented upon by most Dalits who had filed cases. Nadu are clearly seen as important tools in the ongoing struggle against the dominant caste of this region. Crucially, it is a weapon around which local grassroots mobilization has crystallized, even though as a community Arunthathiyars still lack an overarching movement or party to provide them with a sustained and unified political voice and representation in the state. now … we can't say anything … we always have to speak with respect, otherwise they'll put a case against us. For seven days' work they'll only work five days, and we can't do anything'. He further commented that Gounder employers themselves are now tied to the workers: having given workers cash advances of Rs 20,000-30,000 they now can't afford to simply dismiss them: 'We're tied to them … we need them.
GOUNDER PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF THE PoA ACT
… we need workers … we can give food and water for free … but still can't find the workers'.
Gounder narratives about the PoA clearly reveal their anxiety about having lost their grip on a labour force that until fairly recently they were able to control.
This loss of control is partly due to the availability of work in Tiruppur and elsewhere, which attracts ever larger numbers of Arunthathiyars to town (Carswell and De Neve, 2014b; Heyer, 2012) . Moreover, in this region a widespread Gounder narrative has developed that puts the blame on government schemes like the PDS and MGNREGA for having taken away the need for Arunthathiyars to work hard and for making them lazy. Gounder landowners across the region complain about populist government policies that they claim favour lazy Arunthathiyars over hard-working Gounders. One
Tiruppur factory owner, bemoaning the shortage of workers in his company, expressed it in typical fashion: 'Workers have become lazy! They work for two or three days to earn enough to feed their family and for the rest of the week they stay at home and sleep! They don't have to work anymore because the government gives them everything: free TVs, free rice, free everything!'. Gounder landlords similarly complain that the availability of 100 days of paid work under MGNREGA, alongside the attractions of urban work, have not only pushed up agricultural wages, but also taken away much-needed agricultural labour from the fields (Carswell and De Neve, 2013a, 2014a) . Rural power loom owners, most of whom have also invested huge amounts in cash advances, complain that the PoA Act has not only made Dalits laidback and uncommitted to work, but also enabled them to break the bonds of debt that tie them to employers and leave the village in search of employment elsewhere. For
Gounders -landowners and power loom owners like -the PoA undermines their control over a rural agrarian and industrial workforce that until recently they were able to maintain through tightly managed relationships of socioeconomic domination and debt bondage.
Gounders also complain extensively that the PoA Act is being 'misused' by Dalits to escape debt or make money. Disputes over cash advances in the power looms particularly agitate Gounders. One power loom owner who had had three PoA cases filed against him explained: 'if they aren't coming to work and I go to ask them to come, and they don't come and I ask them to repay the advance, then they immediately put a case'. The Mannapalayam village president, a rich Gounder farmer and power loom owner (himself subject to a PoA case), explained: 'if an owner asks for his cash advance back then there might be an argument and in anger both will use words, and then they say you've scolded me, so I'm going to put a [PoA] case'. He claimed that when workers do not turn up for work and owners shout at them or ask for their cash advances to be returned, the workers immediately use this Act, claiming that they were abused by having been called by their caste name. He argued, as many
Gounders do, that Arunthathiyars use the PoA Act to make money and evade repayment of their advances -although ironically the case against him had nothing to do with advances at all.
Even those Gounders who are outside the village take a similar view, as some politically active Gounders told us:
Basically, people only put PCR cases to take money from people. It depends on how rich you are -if middle class they'll take Rs 100,000-200,000. If it's a rich person it'll be Rs 500,000. … Gounders feel it's a prestige problem to go to the police station or jail or court … they don't want to go … and so they give a negotiated amount, and the police will also get some of the money. … people just put PCR to get money.
This narrative of PoA abuse was particularly pronounced among rural powerloom factory owners who claimed that Arunthathiyar power loom workers use the Act to avoid having to repay their outstanding debts. Gounders systematically refer to these cases as pooy cases or false cases. As Nagasamy, a power loom owner in Mannapalayam, put it: 'They get lots of money from us [as cash advances] and when we ask for it or we ask them to come to work, they complain that we abuse them and they put a case against us! They've now got into the habit of putting pooy [false] cases!'. Gounders feel angry that the case can be made against them without evidence. They claim that it is one person's word against another's, and they are not used to their word being treated as equal to that of an Arunthathiyar. As a Gounder woman from
Mannapalayam noted, 'if we just tell anything little to SC people they immediately file a PCR case ... if you just use the word Mathari they will file a case'. 6 Gounders are also angry that they are not able to get anticipatory bail for PoA cases, and therefore complain that 'with no enquiries, no evidence ... we can be arrested'.
Clearly, Gounders have come to fear the use of PoA by Dalits and feel threatened by the stigma, humiliation and expense of having a case filed against them -hence, their eagerness to 'compromise' around PoA cases, which not only prevents cost and conviction but also helps to avoid humiliation and restore social honour within their circles (Baxi, 2010: 227) .
Nevertheless, the Gounders have not easily given in to Arunthathiyar threats and they have their own ways of fighting back. One way is to bribe or co-opt the police -often themselves Gounders -for example, to avoid an FIR being completed or to prevent it being turned into a court case. Gounders openly admitted bribing their way out of PoA cases. As one power loom owner told us, 'we're afraid of the police, so we will give them money -Rs 50,000-60,000 -to drop the case … we give money, plus food and drinks … and the police will drop the case. If we go to jail we have to pay even more!'. Another explained how he had managed to get out of the PoA case put against him: 'I paid Rs 15,000; of that Rs 3,000 went to the man who put the case, and the remaining was shared amongst the police.... The police use this situation to make ever more money!'. Many even stated that the people who do best out of the PoA Act are not the Arunthathiyars but the police, because of the large sums of money they make through bribes. A Dalit activist based in Coimbatore had a particularly negative view of the value of PoA, as he felt Gounders were never brought to account and punished, and most cases never even made it through the courts. He argued that ultimately what was needed was political power, and he expressed a great deal of anger over the fact that the police made huge amounts of money from the bribes paid on these cases: 'in the end all PCR cases are being settled; they negotiate over it and compromise, and it never goes to court. I have never seen a case go to court over here'.
Another response is for Gounders to collectively intimidate Arunthathiyars, thereby forcing them to withdraw a complaint and settle the case informally. While all informants referred to 'compromises' being made, these rarely carried the sense of voluntary and conciliatory settlement implied by the term. 'Compromises' become a site of contestation over power and, as Baxi has noted, act 'as a tool in the hands of defence lawyers and the accused to pressurise complainants and victims to change their testimonies ' (2010: 210) . In most cases compromises amount to a forced 'giving in' by Dalits under pressure from Gounders. Dalits told of how they are fearful and eager to settle, typically stating: 'we were scared and there was no way out'. They not only fear retaliation during the process, but their concerns about their family's safety far outlast the legal case, not least where they are still dependent on Gounders for their livelihood (see also Britto, 2007) . They are often ready to appease the Gounders in the light of counter-threats and intimidation. Indeed a migrant power loom worker in Mannapalayam, who had put a PoA case against his employer following a dispute about the repayment of an advance, explained what happened when they got to the police station:
Some 'Dalit Movement' people were at the police station, and saw fifty
Gounder people around us, and asked what was happening. They helped us fill in the form and said they could file a PCR case. But we didn't want to do that ... we were scared. ... And then one tried to help us make a compromise and settle ... and so we dropped the PCR case.
Arunthathiyars told us that Gounders are very effective at giving each other support, with dozens of them turning up at the police station as soon as any Gounder is accused. As one Dalit explained with reference to a case he was involved in: 'they have phones and vehicles, so they called each other, and over 100 came to the police station.' Gounders themselves confirmed that this is how they support each other. One of them explained that as soon as he was arrested he made a phone call and ninety fellow caste men turned up at the police station to support him. Dalits now have a support network too, but still lack the resources and networks that Gounders have access to.
In addition to taking joint action and forcing Dalits into making compromises, many Gounder landlords and power loom owners now take recourse to migrant labour, in an attempt to reduce their dependency on local Arunthathiyars altogether (see Carswell and De Neve, 2013b) . In Mannapalayam, for example, a substantial part of the power loom labour force now consists of migrant workers (both Dalits and nonDalits), whom Gounder power loom owners consider more reliable and easier to manage. Finally, in a more concerted effort to suppress Arunthathiyars' use of legal action, Gounders have made the alleged 'misuse' of the PoA Act a central issue of their newly launched political party, to which we now turn.
THE GOUNDER COUNTER-OFFENSIVE: THE KONGU NADU

MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM
The anger and frustration of the Gounders have been channelled in quite forceful ways. In addition to their various strategies to annihilate PoA cases -bribing, intimidating and forcing 'compromises' -Gounders also took recourse to a new form of collective action: they reinvigorated their caste association, turned it into a political party and entered electoral politics to bolster their position in the region. This Dalits was a major incentive for rural Gounders to join the party. In interviews with party activists, the alleged 'misuse' of the PoA Act tended to be the first mentioned and most passionately debated issue they wanted addressed. By the time the official manifesto was printed, however, the PoA had moved right down the agenda. This was partly because by then the KNMK had to present a public image of itself as a party that stood for the welfare of the region as a whole, and partly because the leadership realized that this was not a piece of legislation that actually could be changed.
Nevertheless, the issue of the PoA Act remained a major campaigning point in the villages and one that attracted Gounders to vote for KNMK. After the 2009 election,
Mannapalayam's president gave this explanation for the KNMK's success: 'The KNMK did well here ... because there are many Gounders here, and because of the PoA cases they all joined together and voted KNMK. … The KNMK promised they'd change the PoA Act, and that is their main focus -so many Gounders voted for them'. Nagasamy, a power loom owner in Mannapalayam, put it this way: 'I voted for the KNMK … for our safety. Now the KNMK will suppress some of those [PoA] cases'. Importantly, the PoA Act is an issue around which the PMK has also rallied more recently, with its leader Ramadoss asking for a uniting of the intermediate castes to fight for an amendment to the provisions of the PoA Act (Pandian, 2013: 13) . people, but we -who bring in so many earnings -get no support!'. Such narratives -repeated both in town and villages -are typically backed up with reference to the lack of a reliable power supply to agriculture and industry and the lack of support to 7 Similar demands to scrap the PoA Act have been made by the Marathas of Maharashtra (Waghmore, 2013: 78) .
address the pollution issue that affects both farmers and industrialists (see also Vijayabaskar and Wyatt, 2013) .
Crucially, however, for the party to achieve electoral success, an emphasis on the interests of the Gounder community had to be replaced in the run-up to the elections with a focus on the needs of the region as a whole. Thus, at the launch of the party, the name Kongu Vellala Gounder Peeravai, which refers to the Kongu Vellala Gounders, was replaced with a party name that refers to the regeneration of the region as a whole: the Kongu Nadu Munnetra Kazhagam (Kongu Region Development Party). While clearly the product of a caste-based movement, once established as a political party, the association's public rhetoric soon shifted in an attempt to represent the interests of, and appeal to, all people of Kongu Nadu. While the party leaders thus began to claim an interest in the welfare and development of all Kongu Nadu people, the insurmountable paradox of the party became immediately obvious: how to reconcile an exclusive, caste-based and anti-Dalit agenda with an inclusive regional image needed to achieve electoral success? The party emerged from a strong alliance between rural and urban Gounders, both of whom felt increasingly threatened by government policies that they experienced as populist, pro-poor, and undermining
Gounder efforts to develop the region's economy. Yet to have a wider appeal, caste had to be dropped from the agenda and replaced with issues of regional development.
In addition to the narrative of neglect, another major issue on the KNMK agenda is Gounders' demand to be included in the MBC ( Despite being the economically dominant community of the region, this demand was often reiterated as something the community felt entitled to and it was high on the KNMK agenda at the time of both the 2009 and 2011 elections (for further detail, see Vijayabaskar and Wyatt, 2013) .
CHANGING BALANCE OF POWERS?
It is clear that the KNMK is first and foremost a caste-based party that appeals to
Gounder caste identity and is primarily concerned with the interests of Gounders. The launch of a political party by the Gounder elite is a reflection of how this otherwise powerful community feels threatened by Dalits' gradual, albeit still limited, political mobilization and economic advancement in the region. The 2009 election results were telling of the community's political repositioning. Launched less than three months before the Parliamentary elections, the KNMK independently contested twelve constituencies in the western districts of Tamil Nadu, and as a new party they ran a well-organized electoral campaign. While the party won no seats, they did win close to 600,000 votes with several candidates gaining around 100,000 votes (see also Vijayabaskar and Wyatt, 2013) . Most importantly, it was widely agreed after the elections that the KNMK had played a major role in taking votes away from the ruling DMK and its allies in western Tamil Nadu. It was in these districts that the DMK alliance lost most of their seats and that the AIADMK opposition alliancetraditionally more successful among rural Dalits and with a long-term stronghold in western Tamil Nadu (Gorringe, 2007; Harriss, 2002) -obtained some of their main electoral victories. In other words, the KNMK contributed to the losses of the DMKled government and split the vote in western Tamil Nadu. In this sense, the KNMK had a real impact on the 2009 election results.
The fact that it did not win any seats did not discourage the party's leadership.
To the contrary: after the elections there was confidence that the 2011 state-level elections would offer a greater opportunity to win seats. By the time of the 2011 elections, the KNMK had allied itself with the ruling DMK and was allocated seven seats to field candidates in areas where they had performed well in 2009. In the event, the vote for the DMK in those seven constituencies was very low and the KNMK failed to get any of its candidates elected, although it gained around 370,000 votes in total. Campaigning by the KNMK in 2011 was rather ineffective and the alliance with the DMK further contributed to its defeat -not least because of the widespread unease within the Kongu region over the ruling party, its populist welfare policies and widespread corruption. 8 It remains to be seen whether the KNMK's appeal will translate into longer-term electoral success for the party, or whether its agenda will be transformed and ultimately appropriated by the existing Dravidian parties, leading to a weakening of its agenda (Gorringe, 2007) . The police, the government and all other political parties are afraid of the Gounders now. If we ask to file a case, the police won't arrest the Gounder as they fear the community's retaliation. Often, if we put a case, they will put a false counter-case against us in order to force us to come to a compromise and drop the case.
Whether these changes were due to the heightened tensions at the time of elections or the result of direct KNMK intervention is unclear. In any case, Gounders have used their newly launched party to show collective strength and intensify pressure to 'compromise' on PoA cases. As such, the use of the PoA Act continues to be a highly contentious issue in the region around which both Dalits and Gounders now mobilize.
CONCLUSION
In the light of their marginalization within the wider Dalit movement of Tamil Nadu, First, the use of the PoA Act is part of a broader attempt by Dalits to access and mobilize those public spaces and liberal values in the legislation and the state apparatus that allow them to challenge village-based modes of authority and dominance by higher castes (Gorringe, 2013; Rao, 2009; Waghmore, 2013 (Rao, 2009: 176) . Indeed, a significant effect of Arunthathiyars' use of the PoA Act is that it has moved Dalit issues into the public arena and produced a public discourse about caste discrimination that has opened up spaces within the formal state apparatus to challenge local higher-caste authority and exploitation.
A crucial aspect of this is the two-way interaction between Dalit mobilization and the use of the PoA Act: while grassroots mobilization is needed to bring Dalits together and assist them in using this legal tool, the tool itself provides Arunthathiyars with a focal point around which to raise consciousness and build networks of support, or as Gorringe put it, to organize 'routine activism ' (2010b: 111 (Rao, 2009: 177) . In this part of Tamil Nadu, the PoA Act is productive of new social relations as it assists
Arunthathiyars in their long-term struggle to challenge Gounder dominance and to transform caste relations at the local level. Or, following Waghmore (2013: 62) , the Act sits at the crossroads of struggles to transform rural 'untouchable' subjects into post-colonial citizens with equal rights. The existence of the Act -and often just the threat of using it -enables Arunthathiyars to bring cases of abuse out of the fields and workshops into the public sphere, and to re-direct fear, threats and intimidation at those who used to unequivocally dominate them. Indeed, the Act constitutes one of the key state institutions through which rural Dalits in this part of India -and elsewhere (Rao, 2009; Waghmore, 2013 ) -seek to pursue justice and to democratize the public space of the villages in which they work and reside.
However, Arunthathiyars' recourse to the law has also set off a counteroffensive among the dominant Gounders. As Gorringe reminds us, very often 'caste sentiment has been exacerbated as Dalit movements have confronted BC dominance' (Gorringe, 2007: 62) . This is precisely what is happening in western Tamil Nadu.
Dalit litigation has intensified caste antagonism and has made Gounders turn to caste- In conclusion, our analysis provides a number of insights into Dalit social movements and their relationship to both the law and economic empowerment. While the success of social movements among low-caste communities obviously depends on a range of factors, our case study allows for three observations. First, social movements for justice are more likely to have an impact when buttressed by a legal weapon that gives them teeth. Second, Dalit social movements have a greater chance of succeeding when their struggles are accompanied by a wider process of social change and economic empowerment. Third, both litigation and caste mobilization have given individual struggles a collective dimension and a public face by bringing them into the wider institutional arena of state actors and institutions. This is particularly meaningful for Dalits who until very recently were at the receiving end of private threats, intimidation and violence, and whose battles were largely restricted to individualized fights with rural employers. In western Tamil Nadu today, legal weapons, grassroots mobilization and economic empowerment go hand in hand to produce gradual but clearly visible transformations in the public landscape of caste relations. In order to gain sustained political voice and representation at the state level, however, Arunthathiyars' social movement organizations need to further nurture unity and collaboration, and develop leadership that can take grassroots activism to the next level.
